Diabetes Care Plan
2019 · UX Designer, Tata 1mg
A ₹199 membership that saved diabetic households real money, but almost nobody saw it. I redesigned how it shows up inside the medicine purchase. Plan orders grew from about 6 a day to about 1,000 over the following year.
Context
Background
In October 2018, 1mg launched a beta of the Diabetes Care Plan: a six-month membership for people who buy diabetes medicine every month. For one payment of ₹199, a member gets:
25% off
Every prescription medicine order
Free lab tests
Diabetes tests collected at your doorstep
Free consultations
Premium doctor and diet advice
₹0 shipping
On every order
The offer was good. The timing was the problem. The plan only makes sense to someone already buying diabetes medicine, and that person is thirty seconds from checkout.
The problem
A good offer that people never saw
Selling a membership is harder than selling a product. A product rides on the intent already in the basket. A membership asks someone to stop, do the maths and commit to six months, in the middle of a task. Three problems sat on top of each other:
Not seen
People either missed the plan, or saw it and read it as a coupon.
Hard to accept
An interruption has to earn its place. People decide in seconds, often while buying for a parent or a spouse.
No known home
Product page or cart? On landing or on action? Collapsed or expanded? We could not reason our way to the answer, because attention only shows up in observation.
My role
The only designer on the plan
I owned the work end to end: understanding the brief, framing the problem, wireframes, high-fidelity design, usability testing, iteration and documentation. I sat in the meetings where the opportunity was still unclear, turned it into a design problem, tested my own assumptions with real users, and changed my mind on the evidence.
I worked with the Product Manager, Engineering and leadership, including Gaurav, the CEO. Anand Jha, VP of Design, reviewed the work across several feedback cycles. Product owned requirements and the benefit structure, Engineering owned the build, and Data Analytics owned the measurement.
We did multiple iterations and feedback cycles in one of the workflows being designed by her. She responded well to the feedback and asked critical questions before she accepted the changes.Anand Jha, VP of Design, Tata 1mg
Research
One task, tested eleven times
I used guerrilla testing, because it was the only method fast enough to answer an attention question in four weeks. Each round was one prototype, about seven people, then a rebuild. In total I observed about 68 people across 12 iterations. Ten are documented here.
Every session used the same task: buy a Glycomet medicine. The plan was never mentioned. If someone noticed the card, the design had made them notice it.
Existing 1mg users
People who already book diabetes tests and order diabetes medicine. Would they recognise what the plan was worth?
Fresh 1mg users
Staff from non-technical teams inside 1mg, with no product context. Could they understand the plan cold?
Every round asked the same three questions: can people discover the card, is it predictable when they tap, and what do they have to be taught? After each round I wrote down every participant's steps and words, then sorted them into issue buckets. The boards below are shown as written in 2019, original spelling included.
Design evolution
Ten rounds, in order
Each round exists because the one before it failed in a specific way. Looking back, the failures moved through three problems:
Getting seen
Rounds 1 to 5. I moved, tinted and separated the card until I realised the page around it was the problem.
Getting understood
Rounds 6 to 8. People saw it, wanted to inspect it, and could not. I fixed the way in.
Getting the hierarchy right
Rounds 9 and 10. Products could not share the plan's surface, so I gave them their own.
Round 1: Put the plan where the medicine is
Will people notice the plan when a diabetes medicine is added, and understand what it is worth?
What changed. A collapsed card animated over the product page on add, with a hook line, the ₹199 price and a “Know More” text line.
What happened. Five of seven noticed the card. Nobody used Know More. The numbers also failed: “I am not interested in spending 199 just to save Rs 24.”
Decision. Keep the placement. Fix the value case first, because no amount of visual work rescues a bad number.
Round 2: Make the maths work
If the saving is bigger than the plan price, does the offer stop being a calculation?
What changed. Same placement, bigger basket: ₹322 saved against a ₹199 plan, plus an expanded benefits sheet.
What happened. All three noticed it. But two read the plan as a coupon and started asking coupon questions.
Decision. The product page works. Before polishing it, test the cart, where people already hunt for discounts.
Round 3: Move to where the deals are
Does the same card do better on the cart?
What changed. The card moved to the cart and showed on landing instead of on an action.
What happened. Neither person noticed it. Both went straight to the coupon field and the price breakdown.
Decision. Being on the cart is not enough. On landing, the card becomes furniture. Raise its contrast and retest.
Round 4: Turn the contrast up
If the card is louder on the same surface, does discovery follow?
What changed. Stronger tint and clearer separation from the bill.
What happened. Both missed it again. One closed it without reading. The other was genuinely interested once attention was forced.
Decision. Two rounds, four people, zero unprompted discovery. The problem was attention, not the offer or the copy. Stop tuning the card and change what the page does around it.
Round 5: Take the page away
If the rest of the cart recedes, does the card finally get seen?
What changed. The cart behind the card was dimmed, so the card was the only lit thing on screen.
What happened. Eight of eight noticed it, and two added the plan. But nobody knew how to reach the details: one tapped the logo, two tried to scroll the card.
Decision. Dimming solved discovery in one move, after two rounds of failure. Keep it, but first prove that a quieter surface cannot do the same job.
What I saw: four people across two rounds walked past a legible, well-placed card, even when it was louder.
What I believed: the card was not competing on visual weight. It was competing with the cart's own routine of coupons and price breakup.
What I chose: stop designing the card. Dim the page behind it.
What it cost: calm. Dimming interrupts a task, and I was spending some of the user's goodwill to buy attention. I would not accept that on assumption, so round 6 tests the polite alternative.
Round 6: The polite alternative
Can a persistent, non-blocking banner do the work without interrupting anyone?
What changed. The interrupting card was replaced by a banner at the top of the cart.
What happened. Two missed it, three noticed without reading, and one thought ₹199 was a minimum order value.
Decision. A passive surface loses to the cart's own tasks every time. The interruption was doing real work, so go back to it.
Round 7: The last possible moment
Is the moment of paying also a moment people will stop at?
What changed. The card was triggered by the Checkout tap, over a dimmed cart.
What happened. One person added the plan. Others were already leaving. At the tap, people are committing, not evaluating. And the same sentence returned: “couldn't find the way to know more.”
Decision. Stop moving the card. That failure had now shown up six times. Fix what is inside it.
Round 8: Give them the door
After six rounds of people hunting for the details, what if the way in is simply visible?
What changed. “Know More” became a real button, opposite ADD.
What happened. Five of six used it on purpose. Six rounds of hunting ended in one change. Then the expanded view failed the other way: it had no ADD, and one person went through checkout to find that out.
Decision. Explaining and acting are two jobs, and both views have to do both. ADD goes on the collapsed and the expanded view, and swiping opens the card.
Round 9: Can two offers share one surface?
A lab test is a natural companion purchase. Does it work stacked under the plan?
What changed. A Lipid Profile test was placed directly under the plan card.
What happened. The test was either missed or read as something the plan already included. One person added the test, then decided the plan was not needed.
Decision. Two offers on one surface compete. Products need their own surface. This is where the work stopped being a card and became an architecture.
Round 10: List or carousel?
Products now have their own surface. Which layout gets them understood and added?
What changed. The same products as a vertical list and as a horizontal carousel.
What happened. In the carousel nobody swiped, people assumed there were three items, and tapped expecting to navigate. In the list, more products were added. People also said they do not buy medicine because it is cheaper. They want to know it will help their condition.
Decision. A carousel invites browsing. A list invites adding. List view, at its own place on the product page. For medicine, credibility is the ceiling, not discount size.
Insights
Three findings that changed the design
Presence is not discovery
The card was legible, well placed and ignored. The cart has its own routine of coupons and price breakup, and anything outside it becomes furniture. Raising contrast twice changed nothing. Dimming the page took discovery from 0 of 4 to 8 of 8.
People will not commit to what they cannot inspect
People tapped the logo, the card body, tried to scroll it and tried to swipe it. Every guess except the one link provided. They were not refusing the plan. They were refusing to buy six months of something they could not examine first. Once Know More became a button, five of six used it on purpose.
In medicine, credibility is the ceiling, not price
Two offers on one surface compete, and a medicine sells on trust, not discount. So products left the membership card and became a list with names, prices and a per-item ADD. More products were added from the list than from the carousel.
Four findings for the card itself
- Clear Know More. Most people guessed, then tapped the card to see details. They wanted the whole plan before buying.
- A detailed view. Almost everyone wanted to see every benefit first. Four benefits, stated plainly, before any commitment.
- Add on both views. People got confused when ADD was missing from the collapsed view.
- Honour the gestures. People tried swiping up and down, and tapping the DCP logo. So swipe opens the card and the logo leads into the details.
Architecture
Which surface carries the plan
This is what the ten rounds were really for: not what the card looks like, but which surface owns the job. A membership is only persuasive next to proof. The saving is worked out against a real basket, so the argument gets weaker the further it moves from a purchase.
Cart: primary
The basket is complete, so the saving is a real number, and people are already hunting for a better price. The card interrupts once, before checkout, over a dimmed page.
Product page: secondary
Earlier, with one item, so the saving is smaller. But it catches people who never build a multi-item cart, and it is where the member price lives afterwards.
Homepage: not pursued
No basket, no medicine, no number. The plan could only be advertised there, not proven.
Every decision cost something
- Dim the page: bought discovery, from 0 of 4 to 8 of 8. Cost calm, because dimming interrupts a task. Taken, but only after round 6 tested the polite banner and lost.
- Trigger on checkout: bought the moment of maximum price sensitivity. Cost: people were committing, not evaluating. Not adopted.
- Stacked lab test: bought a second offer per interruption. Cost: the weaker offer disappeared into the stronger one. Rejected.
- Carousel: bought more items in less space. Cost: nobody swiped. Rejected for the list.
- Homepage: would have bought reach. Cost: advertising instead of proof. Deprioritised.
The design
One component, two surfaces, four states
The final proposal was not a screen. It was a decision about which surface does which job. The plan interrupts once, at the point of highest price sensitivity, with the page dimmed behind it, a clear way in, and the ability to act from either view. Products leave that surface and get their own. Once someone is a member, the saving stops being an offer and becomes a price.
- Interrupt once, never twice.
- Dim the page, not the card.
- Explain and act in every state.
- One offer per surface. Products live separately, as a list.
The cart, before checkout
The primary surface. The card shows the saving and the plan price, with KNOW MORE and ADD at equal weight. Expanded, it shows the four benefits and keeps its own ADD.
The product page
The same component, earlier in the journey. Collapsed, it carries KNOW MORE. Expanded, it carries the four benefits and its own ADD TO CART. After joining, it stops selling and becomes a member confirmation.
Products at their own level
Cross-sold products leave the membership card. Full-width rows with real names, prices and a per-item ADD: the layout people actually added from, and the one that reads as a recommendation, not as navigation.
After joining
Once the plan is a membership, the member price sits inline on the product page (₹75, DCP members only), with a clear route back into the benefits, and the option to leave.
Outcome
What the data shows, and who it belongs to
Plan orders grew from about 6 a day to about 1,000 over the following year, and engagement and conversion grew by up to 3× quarter on quarter (source: Data Analytics team). That is a programme-level result, built over a year by the whole 1mg design organisation.
On its own, this sprint showed that dimming took discovery from 0 of 4 to 8 of 8, and that 5 of 6 people used Know More once it became a button.
Reflection
What I would carry forward
- Placement is product strategy, not layout. The most important thing I designed was not the card. It was the decision about which surfaces carry it, and which one gets nothing.
- Check the arithmetic before you design the card. Round 1 failed on a number: ₹24 saved against a ₹199 plan. No layout fixes that.
- When the same failure repeats, stop moving the thing. I spent rounds 3 to 7 relocating a card whose problem was inside it. Repetition in the evidence is a diagnosis, not noise.
- Each round should exist because the last one raised a question. Round 6 exists because I would not accept the interruption in round 5 without testing the calm alternative.
- In health, credibility is the ceiling, not price. People do not buy a medicine because it is cheaper. They buy it because they believe it helps.